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Abstract
In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed
that high prices resulted from a cartel’s long positions. The present paper addresses
this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading
results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices
are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with
the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic literature.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, L13.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread presumption among economists that forward trading is socially ben-
eficial. Many theoretical arguments indeed support this view (see [3] for a review). Based
upon the Keynes-Hicks theory of speculation, the most common argument is that forward
trading allows producers to shift risks towards less risk-averse traders ([15], [2]). Besides
improving insurance, forward trading may also improve information sharing as claimed in
[11] or [13]. Moreover, forward trading still improves welfare when a producer has some
market power. [4] shows that a risk-averse monopolist facing competitive traders tackles the
same problem of hedging as in the competitive case and so is better off selling futures, with
the result of increased production and lower cash prices. Considering the market of a good
produced both by a dominant, risk-neutral firm and a competitive, risk-averse fringe, [14]
reaches the conclusion that hedging is still the crucial force that leads risk-averse producers
to sell futures. Finally, [1] claims that forward trading raises welfare even in the absence
of any risk. They investigate the case of Cournot duopolists and characterize an equilib-
rium outcome with greater outputs, hence a lower spot price, compared to the case without
forward trading. The point is that selling forward allows each duopolist to commit to a
Stackelberg level of output on the spot market but, since both do so in equilibrium, no one
succeeds in acquiring a leader advantage. As a result, competition is tougher on the spot
market and welfare is improved, compared to a situation without forward trading.
This study fully concurs with [1] that the oligopolistic paradigm is appropriate for inves-
tigating competition between producers on forward markets. In a paper written before the
development of oil markets in the eighties, [14] indeed quoted maize, wool, rubber among
nine commodities, all with active futures markets and single country shares above 25 percent
in world trade. Furthermore, there is historical evidence that forward trading is vulnerable
to market power (see [10], [7] and [3] for reviews). According to the U.S. Commodity Ex-
change Act of 1936, forward markets might be manipulated by large traders (see also [16]).
More striking is the fact that powerful producers tend to buy their own production forward,
seemingly in order to sustain prices1. The fact that producers may hold long positions is at
odds to the theoretical arguments sketched above.
The challenging question we address here is whether oligopolistic producers may benefit
from softening competition by taking long positions. In a model of price-setting duopolists
1[10] recalls how major exporting countries coordinated on world coffee prices via long positions, in
1977-1978. Other examples of long positions and high prices are given in [7] and [3].
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with differentiated products, we show that the answer is positive. The opening of forward
markets then raises equilibrium prices, which is detrimental to welfare. This result calls for
qualifying the admitted benefits of forward trading.
The intuition underlying these conclusions echoes the analysis in [9] and [5] of the effect
of pre-commitment on competition. In the present framework, buying forward (rather than
selling) commits a producer to set a higher spot price in order to increase the value of his
position. Due to Bertrand competition on the spot market, the other producer reacts by
raising his price, which increases the profit of the first producer. This effect proves to be
quite strong in our analysis since buying forward appears as a strictly dominant strategy. In
equilibrium, both producers buy forward and spot prices are raised above the levels reached
in the absence of forward trading.
2 The Model
Before introducing forward trading, let us first consider a standard static duopoly model.
Two producers, i = A,B, offer substitute goods on different spot markets. They compete
a` la Bertrand by simultaneously setting spot prices (pi, pj) (j 6= i). Producer i thus gets a
spot profit equal to
pii(pi, pj) = piDi(pi, pj)− Ci(Di(pi, pj))
where Di is the demand function for good i. For i = A,B, we assume2
Assumption 1 The cost function Ci and the demand function Di are almost everywhere
twice differentiable, with bounded derivatives. Moreover:
• Ci(D) is non-decreasing on [0,+∞).
• If Di(pi, pj) > 0, then Di1(pi, pj) < 0 and Di2(pi, pj) > 0.
• Di(0, 0) > 0.
This assumption essentially specifies that goods are substitutes (D2 > 0) while ensuring
that a producer cannot be excluded from spot markets (D(0, 0) > 0). Our second assumption
introduces more structure on profit functions:
Assumption 2 If Di(pi, pj) > 0, then pii12(p
i, pj) > 0 and pii11(p
i, pj) + pii12(p
i, pj) < 0.
2Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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This assumption simplifies the study of the static Bertrand equilibrium without forward
trading. In this simple game, the best response of producer i to pj is defined by the max-
imization of pii(pi, pj). The strategic complementarity introduced in the first part of the
assumption implies that best responses are increasing with pj. The second part of the as-
sumption implies that the slope of best response functions is between zero and one, which
ensures the unicity of the static Bertrand equilibrium (see [8] and [6]).
Let us now consider that the Bertrand duopolists have the opportunity to trade forward.
Suppose that, at date 0, each good can be traded on a competitive forward market before
the opening of spot markets at date 1. Traders take positions on forward markets at date 0
and behave competitively. It follows that arbitrage profits are zero under perfect foresight3.
As is customary (see [4]), we assume that forward contracts mature at the time spot markets
meet so that forward positions are settled at spot prices4. By considering that payment
occurs at date 1, we can ignore discount factors.
Consider the case of a producer buying forward his own production. At date 1, he might
want to choose an arbitrarily high spot price in order to squeeze the traders holding the
corresponding short positions. The possibility of squeezing thus threatens the efficiency of
forward markets. Consequently actual forward markets have designed various devices to
deter squeezing. Regulatory institutions often rely on legal requirements which specifically
prohibit the setting of “artificial” prices5. Forward contracts also typically specify a default-
settlement procedure, that is, for example, a maximum penalty if the short trader defaults.
Contracts often include the right to close a short position either by delivering the same
quantity of a similar good (second-sourcing) plus a monetary penalty (also called a delivery
adjustment), or by calling for a cash payment indexed on the price of a similar good6.
Following [16], the opportunity to bring additional supplies to the delivery market at some
3We assume away any risk in order to focus on strategic effects. Note also that consumers could intervene
on the forward market at date 0 without any change in our results.
4To fix ideas we focus on the case of a forward market without physical delivery. This fits the functioning
of most actual forward markets. Hence, positions are settled without physical delivery through an equivalent
monetary payment. Nevertheless, our framework allows for both cases.
5Prices may be considered artificial when the spot prices of goods that are deliverable under the terms
of the contract are high relative to the spot price of nondeliverable goods. According to the United States
law, setting artificial prices is a criminal offense. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is given the
authority “to maintain or restore orderly trading in, or liquidation of, any futures contract” whenever it
suspects “threatened or actual market manipulations and corners”.
6See [4]: “In reality, the payoff in a futures contract is bounded above even if the cash price is not because
a short position holder has the option of defaulting on the contract. In such case, an exchange will follow a
default settlement procedure that typically calls for a cash payment which reflects normal equilibrium price
under the circumstance. For example, the Maine potatoes default of 1976 was settled this way.”
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cost limits squeezing since it places an upper bound upon the price a manipulator can extract.
We specify here a default-settlement procedure which encompasses a variety of cases. In
our model, a short trader on good i is allowed to settle his position either by paying the
price pi or by paying a penalty p¯i(pj) which may depend on the price of the substitute good
j 6= i. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
Assumption 3 For i = A,B, p¯i(pj) is positive and differentiable, with a slope strictly
between 0 and 1. Moreover, for any pj we have
Di(p¯i(pj), pj) > 0 pii1(p¯
i(pj), pj) < 0.
The constraint on the slope of the default price p¯ still allows for the different types of
default-settlement procedures just described. The second part of the assumption excludes
prices so high that demand vanishes. The last part requires that the default price be high
enough, so that it does not constrain the best response functions in the Bertrand game
without forward trading7.
We study the following game. At date 0, both producers simultaneously and publicly8
propose quantities (xi, xj) of their good to traders bidding competitively. This results in
forward prices (f i, f j). We adopt the following convention: xi > 0 if the producer sells
forward, and xi < 0 if the producer buys forward. At date 1, producers simultaneously
set spot prices (pi, pj) and produce up to the demand they respectively face on each spot
market. Agents (traders or producers) then close their forward positions. An agent holding
a short position on good i may either pay pi or p¯i(pj) to agents with a long position. Clearly,
he will choose to pay the lowest of these two prices.
Given forward quantities (x), forward prices (f) and spot prices (p), producer i gets a
total profit which can be decomposed into a spot profit and an arbitrage profit:
pii(pi, pj) + [f i −min(pi, p¯i(pj))]xi. (1)
Because traders behave competitively, in equilibrium the arbitrage profit corresponding
to the bracketted term must equal zero. Nevertheless this term plays an important role
because it drives the choice of spot prices at date 1.
7Two remarks are noteworthy here. First, such a default price schedule can be shown to exist under
various assumptions. An example is given in Section 5. Second, the strict inequalities in assumption 3 could
be relaxed in order to include limiting cases, at the price of simplicity since multiple equilibria could then
appear.
8The observability of producers’ positions on the forward market is crucial for the existence of a commit-
ment effect. Our model is thus best-fitted for producers taking large positions such as the marketing boards
of major exporting countries.
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In the following we characterize the pure-strategy, Nash-perfect equilibria of this two-
stage game. Subgames beginning at date 1 are called forward-influenced subgames. They
are studied in the next section.
3 The forward-influenced subgames
Given forward quantities (x) and prices (f), consider the Bertrand game defined by the profit
functions (1). Notice that if producer i sets a price pi above the default price p¯i(pj), then
the second term becomes a constant and the first term is strictly decreasing with pi from
assumption 3. Therefore any best response of producer i to the price pj chosen by producer
j must be solution to the following program P i:{
maxpi pi
i(pi, pj)− pixi
0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(pj)
Under our assumptions, this program displays strong regularity properties. The following
result then easily obtains (all proofs are given in Appendix) :
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium (PA(xA, xB), PB(xB, xA)) in each forward-
influenced subgame. These equilibrium spot prices are non-increasing with xA and xB.
This result illustrates the main strategic effect. From the profit function in P i, we see
that any increase in forward sales leads to choosing a lower spot price at date 1 because
the producer wants to close his position at the lowest cost. This effect is quite general
and also holds in [1], when Cournot competition prevails on the spot market9. Here this
property of reaction functions translates into lower equilibrium prices, a result which also
holds under simple models of Cournot competition. In fact, the key difference between these
two frameworks only becomes apparent when producers choose their forward positions at
date 0, as we shall see now.
4 The full game
In any Nash-perfect equilibrium of the full game, competition between traders must reduce
any arbitrage profit to zero. Therefore, each producer’s total profit (1) reduces to
Πi(xi, xj) = pii(P i(xi, xj), P j(xj, xi)). (2)
9Under Cournot competition, producers still want to close their positions at the lowest price. This
reduction in price is obtained through an increase in production.
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As equilibrium spot prices are non-increasing with positions, intuitively each producer
should reduce his position below the static level xi = 0 in order to increase profits. This is
indeed what happens and the result is strong enough to be stated in terms of dominated
strategies :
Lemma 1 For each producer i, selling forward (xi > 0) is a strictly dominated strategy.
Moreover, given that the other producer does not sell forward (xj ≤ 0), then not buying
forward (xi ≥ 0) is a strictly dominated strategy.
The intuition here is at odds with the intuition prevailing under Cournot competition. In
both cases, at date 0 each producer realizes that selling less forward (or buying more forward)
is a way to increase his spot price at date 1. However, due to the strategic complementarity
inherent in Bertrand competition, an indirect effect is to lead the other producer to also
increase its price, hence competition is relaxed and profits increase.
Note that two rounds of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies are needed
here. This is simply because in our model, a producer is allowed to sell forward a quantity
so high that he will be led to set a zero spot price at date 1. Clearly such a behaviour is
dominated. Once it is excluded, an additional round is enough to get Lemma 1. Consequently
:
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium of the full game must be such that both producers buy their
own production forward, with equilibrium prices higher than at the equilibrium without for-
ward trading.
The second part of the Proposition clearly follows from the first part, together with
Proposition 1.
This competition-softening effect of long positions we exhibit here is far from being only
of purely academic interest. For instance, the alleged coffee market manipulation in 1977 be-
gan with long positions held by Brazil and El Salvador, two of the world’s largest producers,
in the Coffee “C” futures contracts on the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange. [10] reports
that “35 percent of the long contracts on the New York exchange on November 15, 1978 were
held by traders from producing countries”, just before the Bogota Group was charged with
agreeing on collusive coffee prices. In the well-known cases of the wheat futures contract
in March 1979 at the Chicago Board of Trade and the May 1976 Maine potato contract at
the New York Mercantile Exchange, long open interest was concentrated in a few hands and
even exceeded the deliverable supply (see [3]).
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Still Proposition 2 does not exclude cornering, in the sense that short traders are led to
exercise the default-settlement procedure by paying the default price p¯ for one good or both.
Intuitively cornering should not happen if default prices are high enough. The following
result indeed supports this intuition:
Lemma 2 Suppose that default prices verify
∀ i, j 6= i ∀ pj (pii1 + pii2)(p¯i(pj), pj) < 0. (3)
Then for producer i, choosing to buy forward a quantity xi such that P i(xi, xj) = p¯i(P j(xi, xj))
is a strictly dominated strategy.
Recall that, from assumption 2, pii1(p, p
′)+pii2(p, p
′) is decreasing with p, for any p′. Hence
(3) indeed requires that the default price be high enough. We immediately obtain:
Proposition 3 Suppose that default prices are high enough to verify (3). Then in any
equilibrium of the full game, prices are higher than in the equilibrium without forward trading,
but are below default prices.
This result shows that our competition-softening effect holds in a smooth manner. Indeed
equilibrium prices and quantities do not depend anymore on default prices, as long as default
prices verify (3).
5 Some comparative statics
Proposition 3 offers a condition under which none of the constraints in P i is binding in
equilibrium. We can therefore define the price reaction function Rj(pi, xj) of producer j as
pij1(R
j, pi) = xj.
The following expression plays an important role hereafter :
θi ≡ D
i
2
−Di1
(pi, pj)
∂Rj
∂pi
(pi, xj).
The Appendix shows that 0 < θi < 1 when this expression is computed at the equilibrium
outcome. As in [17], θi can be thought of as an index of both the substitutability between
goods (first ratio) and the degree of competition (the derivative of Rj). The Appendix then
shows that equilibrium prices and quantities must satisfy
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pi − Ci′
pi
=
1
εi
1
1− θi
−xi
Di
=
θi
1− θi (4)
where εi is good i’s demand elasticity at equilibrium prices. These conditions relate the
Lerner index at equilibrium to the size of forward trade (x/D). Intuitively making goods
more substitutable (increasing θi) increases the equilibrium price and the quantity traded
forward. Hence the competition-softening effect of long positions has the largest impact
when competition is toughest. Also, this contradicts the view in [1] that the opening of
forward markets makes competition tougher.
This intuition may be verified in a simple linear demand/linear cost setting:
∀ i = A,B Di(pi, pj) = ai − bipi + dipj Ci(q) = ciq.
Assume that these parameters are positive, with the usual conditions that bi > di and
ai > bici.10 Assumptions 1 and 2 are easily verified. Assumption 3 requires
ai + bici + dipj
2bi
< p¯i(pj) <
ai + dipj
bi
with a slope of the default price between 0 and 1. Condition (3) in Proposition 3 reduces
this interval to
ai + (bi − di)ci + dipj
2bi − di < p¯
i(pj) <
ai + dipj
bi
.
Under this assumption, any equilibrium must verify (4). Note that in this linear setting,
we have
θi =
di
bi
dj
2bj
= θj ≡ θ < 1
2
.
Interestingly we get from (4) that equilibrium quantities bought forward are proportional
to final demands, even though firms are not symmetric:
−xi
Di
=
θ
1− θ =
−xj
Dj
and this ratio is less than one because θ is less than one-half.
Finally the linearity of demands and costs ensures that the global profit in (2) is concave.
Therefore the unique solution (xA, xB, pA, pB) to (4) indeed forms an equilibrium outcome
of the game. It can be verified that these four quantities are increasing with θ.
10These conditions ensure that i) demand decreases when both prices are increased by the same amount
ii) demand is positive when price equals marginal cost, even when pj = 0.
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6 Conclusion
In the history of alleged manipulations on futures markets, it has often been observed that
unreasonable prices resulted from long positions held by a cartel. To address this issue,
we have investigated a model in which duopolists producing two differentiated goods may
trade forward before competing a` la Bertrand on spot markets. As a result, in equilibrium
producers buy forward their own production and prices are raised above the level reached
without forward trading. Thus profits are increased and the traditional assertion that forward
trading improves welfare turns out to be false.
The argument of this article is not that forward trading is harmful but rather that it is
not as virtuous as the academic literature suggests. More research should be devoted to the
study of forward trading as a collusive tool in a cartel’s hand. As a suggestion for further
research, the present model could be extended to allow for demand or price uncertainty on
spot markets. There is obviously a conflict between the competition-softening effect of long
positions emphasized here and the traditional risk-hedging motive that induces risk-averse
producers to sell their output forward, insofar as they are more risk-averse than traders. It
would be instructive to determine which motive would dominate and see to what extent the
folklore that “forward trading causes output to rise and price to fall” is a good approximation.
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Proof Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1: under our assumptions, each program P i admits a unique,
continuous solution Ri(pj, xi), non-decreasing with respect to pj, and non-increasing with
respect to xi. Ri may be equal to zero, or to p¯i(pj), or in the interior case be defined by
pii1(R
i, pj) = xi. (5)
In each case, under assumptions 2 and 3 the slope of Ri with respect to pj is non-negative
and strictly less than 1. By symmetry the same result holds for the best response function of
seller j. Existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium then follow11. Finally, any increase in
xi must reduce both equilibrium prices, since the best-response function Ri is non-increasing
with xi.
For further use, let us consider the properties of the best-response function Ri(p, 0) in
the absence of forward trading. Under assumption 1, Di(0, p) is positive for any p, and
consequently pii1(0, p) = D
i − Ci′Di1 is also positive. Also, under assumption 3, pii1(p¯i(p), p)
is negative. Therefore the constraint in P i is not binding, and Ri(p, 0) is defined by
pii1(R
i(p, 0), p) = 0. (6)
Moreover, since
pii1 = D
i + (p− Ci′)Di1 pii2 = (p− Ci
′
)Di2 (7)
we get
pii2(R
i(p, 0), p) > 0. (8)
Let us now explore more precisely the properties of the Nash correspondence (PA(xA, xB),
PB(xB, xA)). Define
x¯i(xj) = pii1(0, R
j(0, xj)).
Notice that x¯i(xj) > 0 since, as shown above, pi1(0, p) is positive for any p. Now (P
i = 0,
P j) are equilibrium prices for the subgame (xi, xj) if and only if the following best-response
conditions are verified:
11Strictly speaking, existence requires that the slopes of reaction functions be bounded away from 1. We
neglect this point in the rest of the paper, so as to avoid cumbersome assumptions.
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P j = Rj(0, xj) pii1(0, P
j) ≤ xi
which holds if and only if xi ≥ x¯i(xj) and P j = Rj(0, xj). Similarly, define pˆj(xj) as the
unique solution in p to
p = Rj(p¯i(p), xj) (9)
and xi(xj) as
xi(xj) ≡ pii1(p¯i(pˆj(xj)), pˆj(xj)) (10)
which is negative from assumption 3. Then (P i = p¯i(P j), P j) are equilibrium prices for
the subgame (xi, xj) if and only if the following best-response conditions are verified:
P j = Rj(p¯i(P j), xj) pii1(p¯
i(P j), P j) ≥ xi
which holds if and only if xi ≤ xi(xj) and P j = pˆj(xj).
To sum up:
Lemma 3 Given i, there exist two thresholds xi(xj) < 0 < x¯i(xj) such that:
• if xi ≤ xi(xj), then the equilibrium spot prices are (p¯i(pˆj(xj)), pˆj(xj)) and do not depend
on xi;
• if xi ≥ x¯i(xj), then the equilibrium spot prices are (0, Rj(0, xj)) and do not depend on
xi;
• otherwise the equilibrium spot prices are such that
pii1(P
i, P j) = xi. (11)
Proof of Lemma 1 : First notice that from Lemma 3, Πi does not depend on xi for
xi ≥ x¯i(xj). Let us now show that Πi is decreasing with xi when 0 < xi < x¯i(xj). By
definition of the reaction function Rj, we can write
Πi(xi, xj) = pii(P i(xi, xj), Rj(P i(xi, xj), xj)).
Since P i and Rj are non-increasing with respect to xi, we have almost everywhere (omit-
ting the arguments for the sake of clarity)
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∂Πi
∂xi
=
∂P i
∂xi
[pii1 + pi
i
2
∂Rj
∂pi
]. (12)
From (11) and assumption 2, ∂P
i
∂xi
< 0. There remains to study the bracketted term. We
know that ρ ≡ ∂Rj
∂pi
∈ [0, 1], and from assumption 2 (pii1 + ρpii2)(p, p′) is decreasing with p, for
any p′. Moreover Ri is defined by (5) and is thus decreasing with xi: for xi > 0, we get
P i = Ri(P j, xi) < Ri(P j, 0).
This yields
(pii1 + ρpi
i
2)(P
i, P j) > (pii1 + ρpi
i
2)(R
i(P j, 0), P j).
From (6) and (8), the right-hand-side is non-negative. This shows that Πi is strictly
decreasing with xi, as announced. Therefore selling forward a positive quantity xi > 0 is a
strictly dominated strategy.
Now, if xj ≤ 0, then we know from Lemma 3 that either P j = p¯j(P i) or P j is interior.
In both cases, ∂R
j
∂pi
is positive. Then using (6) and (8) we can compute (12) at xi = 0, and
show that it is negative. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: it follows from Lemma 1 that in any equilibrium one must
have xi < 0 and xj < 0. Proposition 1 then yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 2 : from Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show that the right-derivative
of (12) is positive at the right of xi = xi(xj). For these values of x
i, P i is given by (11) so
that ∂P
i
∂xi
< 0. Moreover, from (7) we obtain that pii2 > 0 since pi
i
1 = x
i < 0. Therefore the
bracketted term in (12) is below pii1 + pi
i
2, which is negative at x
i = xi(xj) from (3). This
shows the domination result.
Proof of Proposition 3 : the result is a consequence of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.
Section 5 : we now know that xi < 0 and that (11) holds. Moreover the bracketted
term in (12) must be zero. This yields
xi = pii1 = −pii2
∂Rj
∂pi
. (13)
Using (7), we get pii2 = (pi
i
1 −Di)Di2/Di1. Replacing in (13) we get
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xi = (xi −Di)θi
which shows that 0 < θi < 1 since xi < 0. The second part of (4) then follows. The first
part is then a consequence of (13). 
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